




# Experience with LHC Beam Loss Monitoring system (and lessons for FAIR)





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FAIR Commissioning and Control WG
GSI, November 18<sup>th</sup>, 2015



### Outlook




- 1. Motivation: LHC beam and machine protection
- 2. System specification
- 3. Reliability
- 4. Choice of detector technology
- 5. Electronics
- 6. Data definition and flow
- 7. Loss examples (injection losses, UFOs)
- 8. Beam-abort thresholds
- 9. New developments



### Motivation: LHC beam





250 MJ/beam

(a few weeks ago)

wikipedia.org:

1 MJ is

approximately the

kinetic energy of a

one-tonne vehicle

moving at 160 km/h


SIS-100: only 100 kJ (p)

- pulsing machine, loss-generating processes repeat regularly



### Motivation: loss consequences






December 5, 2003, 1.5 MJ beam lost on the aperture in TeVatron, causing massive quenches and damage of the vacuum chamber and collimators - 2 weeks to repair.

# 65K

# Machine protection: redundancy



Protection scheme against beam losses in superconducting magnets.



+ other systems (about 20) which can trigger interlock and dump the beam

# Beam losses and monitoring objectives



BLM system has 2 functions: protection and diagnostics (measurement). the two roles have different requirements! - compromises

Beam losses are regular (controlled, slow) and irregular (uncontrolled). Examples of irregular losses:

- Obstacles and falling objects (UFOs)
- Orbit changes (for instance due to magnet current error)
- Wrong collimators setting
- Wrong tune
- Beam instabilities ...

### <u>Irregular losses may result in:</u>

- Quenching superconducting magnet
- Unnecessary activation of accelerator elements and environment
- Single Event Upsets in tunnel electronics
- Damage of vacuum chamber



# System parameters



### The most important BLM system parameters:

<ul> <li>Sensitivity</li> </ul>	m
<ul> <li>Dynamic range</li> </ul>	m/p
<ul> <li>Response time and temporal resolution</li> </ul>	p
<ul> <li>Spatial resolution</li> </ul>	m
<ul> <li>Reliability</li> </ul>	p
<ul> <li>Radiation hardness</li> </ul>	p
<ul> <li>Availability</li> </ul>	þ
<ul> <li>Physical size</li> </ul>	-




# System specification



Main document dates 2004, but based on previous studies.
(LSA structures were specified in 2007)

### Key parameters:

- · Sensitivity: 5% of quench level
- Dynamic range: about  $10^5$  for signal integration time 40  $\mu$ s
- Response time  $\leq 1$  turn (0.1 ms)
- Failure rate (reliability):





# BLM sanity check




Check which runs before every fill:

### Connectivity check

Detects non-conformities of cabling, verify HV, can detect issues in the tunnel electronics. (J. Emery, J. Instrum. 5 (2010) C12044)

### Internal beam permit check

Verify ability of every threshold comparator to send beam dump request.





### Detector choice (I)





### **Ionization chamber**

(similar to the one used in SPS)

Stainless steal cylinder

Parallel electrodes distance 0.5 cm

(Aluminium)

Diameter 8.9 cm

Voltage 1.5 kV

Low pass filter at the HV input


Length 60 cm

N<sub>2</sub> gas filling at 1.1 bar

Sensitive volume 1.5 l



Initial choice for high-rad areas: Secondary Emission Monitor (SEM)







### Detector choice (II)



### **Ionization chamber properties**







beam tests

simulations


Well known and reliable component (SPS ionization chambers are in use since 30 years)



### **Electronics**



### Parallel, redundant channels:



### **Analog front-end FEE**

Current to Frequency Converters (CFCs) Tunnel FPGAs: Actel's 54SX/A radiation tolerant. Communication links: Gigabit Optical Links.

#### **Real-Time Processing BEE**

FPGA Altera's Stratix EP1S40
Mezzanine card for the optical links
3 x 2 MB SRAMs for temporary data storage
NV-RAM for system settings and threshold
table storage

- masking



### Data definition



Signal is integrated in 40 µs time window (25 kHz samplig).

The 40  $\mu$ s time windows are assembled into 12 running sums: 40  $\mu$ s, 80  $\mu$ s, 320  $\mu$ s, 640  $\mu$ s, 2.56 ms, 10.24 ms, 81.92 ms, 0.655 s, 1.31 s, 5.24 s. 20.97 s, 83.89 s.

The 12 running sums are compared with 12 thresholds in FPGA.


All data cannot be archieved! Data are logged in LHC Logging DB with initial frequency of 1 Hz, further reduced after 1 week for permanent storage.

In addition there are special buffers (PostMortem, Study) which store a given number of 40 µs time windows and which can be recovered under special conditions (eg. beam dump).



### Data diagram








# Loss example (I): collimation








# Loss example (II): quadrupole



irregular loss (eg. due to orbit distortion)



Particles first lost in places with a large  $\beta$ -function and/or dispersion: quadrupoles and dispersion suppressor.

<u>During Run I this loss scenario turned out to be irrelevant!</u>


Every 3rd detector was moved to another location.



# Loss example (III): massive quench at injection




Quench of 4 dipole magnets at injection due to wrong current in MQ magnets. Injected one bunch of 8E9 protons.



# Loss example (IV): nonconformities



### Loss at overinjection










# Loss example (V): UFOs




UFOs are sudden losses lasting about 0.5-2 ms.

Sometimes they dump the beam (exceeding BLM thresholds).

Post Mortem data of the first UFO which dumped the LHC beam








# Loss example (V): millisecond quench test



- Goal: measure steady-state quench level for UFO-type loss.
- Superconducting machine not easy to generate beam loss in millisecond timescale (wire scanner test in 2010).
- Help comes from transverse damper fast magnet with programmable feedback loop.
- Beam intensity below pilot bunch.



Preparation: additional BLMs






# Beam-abort thresholds (I)



The beam should be stopped when:

- Loss level is close to quench level of superconducting magnet
- Loss level is close to damage of accelerator element
- Loss level is abnormally high, showing some problems with settings (for instance collimation hierarchy breaking).



LHC: most thresholds driven by quench prevention

Quench impact - long recovery (up to 5 hours) In Tevatron it was worst refilling antiprotons

Nice surprise: almost no quenches in LHC:

- good orbit stability
- large stability margin

HERA, total: 189 quenches in 10 years




### Beam-abort thresholds (II)



Typical threshold on cold magnet based on LHC Note 44:

$$T = Q_{BLM}(E) \Delta H(E,t)/E_{dep}(E,t)$$





# Beam-abort thresholds (III)





### <u>Warm magnets</u> - conditions to compute thresholds:

- short loss: should not be damaged
- long loss: should not be overheated (about 100 C)

### Collimators:

thresholds typically far from damage level, determined by assumed beam lifetime and hierarchy.








# New developments (I)



### New detectors:

- Little ionization chamber (with lower gas pressure) lower sensitivity
- Fast diamond detectors bunch-by-bunch measurements





# New developments (II)




Idea: put BLM detectors closer to magnet coil.

Cryogenic BLMs tested at in various conditions on the beamtest lines.

Signals from Si and Diamond detectors were measured at 1.9 K.

Test installation on the cold mass of LHC magnets.

The same readout electronics as standard system.



Better sensitivity to beam losses (less material in front)



## Summary



- 1. BLM system is critical for safety of LHC machine.
- 2. It plays a crucial role in beam diagnostics.
- 3. Complex but very reliable system (no spurious beam dumps).
- 4. Developments ongoing: CryoBLM, Cerenkov fibers, etc...

### For FAIR:

- Complex data definition and flow.
- System self-diagnostics once per day.
- Some loss scenarios turned out irrelevant (but we would not know it without BLM system).
- Unexpected loss scenarios appeared.

Thank you for your attention!



# Additional slides





### Limitations





Example: debris from ATLAS and slow beam losses in the triplet:

In order to protect Q2 magnet the threshold for slow losses should be set very close to constant debris signal.

Spurious beam dumps would be unavoidable.

Similar problem of radiation masking signal from dangerous beam loss is observed in other locations on LHC.








# Beam-abort thresholds (III)



One of the most spectacular quench tests: generate millisecond scale losses using with Wire Scanner at 3.5 TeV.

Motivation: explore quench limit for losses similar to UFOs.


Quench occurred after about 10 ms




Max E<sub>dep</sub> FLUKA: 62.5 mJ/cc

QP3: 38 mJ/cc (preliminary)

we call it a good agreement








# LHC Detector choice (III)







### current [pA]

### Total received dose:

ring 0.1 to 1 kGy/year extr 0.1 to 10 MGy/year

### 30 years of operation

Measurements done with installed electronic

### Relative accuracy

- $-\Delta\sigma/\sigma$  < 0.01 (for ring BLMs)
- $-\Delta\sigma/\sigma$  < 0.05 (for Extr., inj. BLMs)

Gain variation only observed in high radiation areas

### Consequences for LHC:

- No gain variation expected in the straight section and ARC of LHC
- Variation of gain in collimation possible for ionisation chambers